Air Force

The Air Force must be centred around an Air Superiority platform in light of the equipment being fielded in the region. These aircraft must kinematically match or beat emerging threat aircraft that include the Su-57, Su-35, J-20, and J-31 types. With projected advances in Radar, Infra Red, and ECM jamming (that can blind radars and reduce detection ranges) Australia cannot accept an intrinsically inferior flying platform like the F-35 that relies heavily on its present day stealth and sensor advantage. A long range air combat fighter, with superior aero performance, is the only viable option.

Establishing air dominance is essential in facilitating all other ADF operations under an AIR AND SENSOR UMBRELLA - enabling our size limited forces to 'punch far above their weight'. Numerous air superiority fighters will provide cover for dedicated tactical bombing aircraft and dual use training aircraft. Maintaining an expanded and strengthened air force should be seen as the most important feature of our Homeland Defence (closely followed by an expanded Army), and is a matter of National Security.

The RAAF's other primary function is to provide a Strategic Strike capability using air-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched hypersonic missiles, to knock out high value targets on land and at sea.

Note: The equipment selection here recognises of two tiers of capability. Aircraft, either drones or piloted, that can be forward deployed into contested airspace, and those that can't. The latter consist of high value support aircraft, or maritime reconnaissance aircraft, that would be prey to opposition stealth aircraft or high speed long range fighters. High levels of manned aircraft will always be required in the event the drones are jammed or hacked and thereby made inoperable or unreliable.

Air Superiority, Strike & Electronic Warfare:

F/A-XX Air Superiority Fighters (120+) 

F/A-XX 'Grey Ghost' aircraft, with exceptional range and speed, using variable cycle engines, and operating in one and two seat variants, will provide the backbone of the RAAF. Along with their standard air-to-air missile load the aircraft will also carry at least four extreme short range anti-missile missiles. While their Primary Mission is Air Defence they will have a significant strike/ground attack capability. These fighters will feature IRST, with front, side, and rear facing sensors - since infra red cannot be jammed when ECM reduces radar detection ranges.

F-22A/C Raptors (12)

F-22A/C Raptors of the USAF will be permanently based and maintained within the country and partly crewed by Australian pilots. These aircraft, upgraded with variable cycle engines, IRST, and anti-missile missiles, will be used as specialist air defence fighters.

UCAVs (26+)

Two squadrons of UCAVs will be needed for long range strike, recon and picket line air defence missions (using Meteor and Sidewinder X missiles). They will also carry four short range anti-missile missiles. These aircraft will operate in conjunction with the large early warning drones (see later). Up to four squadrons of UCAVs should be considered numbering fifty or more aircraft in total.

FB-23A Long Range Strike Bombers (36)

FB-23As are the primary strike aircraft of the ADF. In addition to carrying air-to-surface weaponry these aircraft will be equipped with a combination of two long range self defence missiles and a number of short range anti-missile missiles. This platform will also be able to act as a tanker being configurable for buddy-buddy air-to-air refuelling in contested areas using a drogue system situated in the bomb bay. These aircraft are replacements for the F-111 and are expected to fly manned recon missions if necessary.

EB-23A Electronic Warfare Aircraft (12)

These EB-23 Electronic Warfare variants will act in the role of the EF-111 and are to accompany the FB-23s on long range strike missions.

Long Range Hypersonic Recon Drones (8)

These Hypersonic Drones will provide intelligence information in the absence of satellite imagery and operate over land and sea in high threat environments. They will take the place of slower moving and more vulnerable platforms like the MQ-4C Triton and use RADAR, LIDAR and Photo/IR mapping systems.

Hypersonic Tactical Missiles (1000+)

Truck mounted Hypersonic Tactical Missiles will be operated by the Air Force and have a range of more than 8,000km. The number of missiles required will be upwards of 1000 to 2000 with multiple reloads for the six round launch vehicles (launch tubes will be larger than those featured in the image). The missiles are intended to strike high value targets throughout the region on land and at sea, including airfields, command and control (communications) centres, other high value military facilities, power stations (including nuclear ones) and shipping. These weapons are considered as part of the country's strategic deterrent.

Tactical Air and Training:

Operating under the protection provided by Air Superiority aircraft will be tactical fighter bombers, armed UAVs, and dual use training aircraft operating in the ground attack role. All training aircraft are required to operate as light attack platforms with limited air-to-air combat capability with off boresight targeting.  

FA-18F Super Hornets (44) - Block III standard aircraft, featuring IRST and improved range, will operate as multirole 'bomb trucks'. Block IV upgrades will see the introduction of variable cycle engines.

EA-18G Growlers (12) - Block III/IV electronic warfare aircraft will be focused on battlefield support operations.

MQ-9 Reapers (18+) - are to provide near continuous surveillance in support of Army operations and act in the ground attack role. Such UAVs can be used as air defence decoys or scouts for forward deployment of Army rotary wing aircraft. Because of the threat of jamming, manned aircraft systems must still be retained at the current levels presently envisaged.

M-346 Masters (66) - these multi-mission trainers, upgraded with AESA radar, are a key component of the tactical air force with half their number operating in a dedicated ground attack role at all times.

Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucanos (65) - will carry FLIR pods, air-to-ground missiles, JDAM or LGBs, and be armed with Sidewinders for anti-helicopter operations. Some aircraft may carry (proposed) front and rear scanning AESA air defence radar pods to improve situational awareness during missions.

AWACS & Support Aircraft:

AWACS and AEW aircraft are to be equipped with IRST sensors and routinely carry long range self defence missiles such as the Meteor and short range anti-missile missiles. Piloted high value aircraft, in the event of high intensity war, such as the E-7A Wedgetails, are to avoid forward deployment with drones operating as their eyes and ears. This is a key reason for having drones - because they are semi-expendable. The piloted vehicles would act as command and control centres.

UAV AEW Drones (12) - are to be employed for forward airborne sensing using AESA radar, IRST and have long range and short range self defence air-to-air missiles stored in aerodynamic pods. Multiple drones will operate at any one time.

 

 

E-7A Wedgetail AWACS (6) - will be equipped with IRST and have four long range self defence missiles and at least eight short range anti-missile missiles stored in aerodynamic pods. They will also act as command and control aircraft for drone AEW aircraft.

KC-30A Voyager Tankers (9) - are intended to top up aircraft in low intensity environments or outside of contested airspace. Forward tanking will be undertaken using FB-23s equipped with a bomb bay refuelling system. Up to five A400M Atlas transports will also be acquired for use as tankers when necessary (see ADF Air Transport).

C-37A Gulfstreams (5) - are to fly SIGINT/ELINT/ISR/EW missions in support of various ADF operations once air supremacy is achieved or in low threat areas.

P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol (15) - upgraded with a MAD detector, front and rear facing IRST systems and equipped with aerodynamic pods containing self defence missiles.

MQ-4C Triton Maritime Recon Drones (7) - are to be used in low threat environment surveillance but likely withdrawn in high intensity situations where long range 'emerging threat' fighters are in operation. Specific wartime targeting recon will nominally come from hypersonic drones (or satellites).

UAV Maritime Recon Airships (7) - will operate in a similar capacity to the Tritons. They will have multi-day endurance and be withdrawn in times of conflict.

JORN over-the-horizon long range radar is to operate in its present capacity. 

Aggressor Aircraft

MIG-35 Fulcrums (5) - these super-manoeuvrable aircraft are to be used in air combat training exercises and must be updated with the best available systems including thrust vectoring engines. Within-visual-range air combat training must be maintained at a high standard in the event that RAAF fighters participate in the enforcement of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). An alternative aircraft for this training task may be the SAAB Gripen E.

ADF Air Transport Capability can be reviewed here.

Addendum: Air Force Reserves/Airbases

*A number of Reserve Squadrons will be established in order to maintain an expanded force of pilots able to become fully active in a time of conflict. RAAF pilots leaving full time duty would be encouraged to operate in a reserve capacity. These squadrons would operate separately to training squadrons with at least one based in each state or territory. Each squadron would be equipped with eight CT-4E basic trainers, one or two Super Tucanos, and one or two Hawk 127s (the jets acquired from inventory set to be replaced by M-346 Masters).

*Airbase facilities are to be strengthened and expanded in the South with prepared stations in the North occupied when necessary. Large scale permanent far Northern deployments are to be avoided in order to lessen the damage caused by cruise missile or airstrikes. All airbases, either in the North or South, are to feature hardened or underground structures with dispersed buildings. Furthermore, anti-air/anti-missile defence systems will be incorporated.

Ground security elements, including in the design of the actual bases, are to be greatly improved to counter commando style attacks. For more information see this article: Hardening RAAF Air Base Infrastructure.